Alaa Alghamdi

The position of Muslims in Western societies has changed significantly in the years since September 11, 2001, but the changes are more complex than is sometimes assumed. The increase in Islamophobia is one generalized reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City. The term Islamophobia is sometimes used to describe the attitudes of non-Muslims towards Muslim citizens of Western countries. Although the term was coined as far back as1922 (Cesari 2006), it is finding new application since 9/11.

Although the term Islamophobia is criticized in academic circles, because it is imprecisely applied, it pre-dates concerns about terrorism, and was in the past much more closely associated with a generalized xenophobia and the conflicts between the Christian and Muslim worlds that have occurred since the crusades of the Middle Ages. Since 9/11, its application has been, mainly, in talking about anti-terrorism, but the ambiguity about the word and its meaning persists.

Likewise, discrimination existed towards Muslim people in the West prior to 9/11; for example, American studies dating from the 1980s and 1990s reveal broad-based social and professional exclusion of Muslim citizens from high-ranking professional and civic positions (Cainkar n.d.). These same studies reveal that the situation was improving by the 1990s, only to suffer a huge setback following 9/11.

The discrimination against Muslim people prior to the terrorist attacks was often not recognized as such. Demographically, these individuals were “hidden under the Caucasian label” (ibid) and this sometimes minimized their marginality, or the perception of it. The biggest shift, therefore, since 9/11 was that the Arabs and South Asian populations of Western powers suddenly became much more visible, as did acts of racism perpetrated against them. Many such acts took place, especially in the United States, immediately following 9/11. In the period immediately following the terrorist attacks, 645 bias incidents and hate crimes against Arabs and South Asians were reported in the US. A mosque was attacked in Chicago the following day, followed by near-continuous attacks against Muslim- based organizations and buildings (ibid).

The resurgence of the term Islamophobia in this new historical context post-9/11 is not the only example of the resurrecting, sometimes conscious, of an antiquated terminology. As reported by BBC journalist Barnaby Mason in the week following September 11, 2001, US President George W. Bush referred to the war on terrorism as a crusade, much to the concern of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Bush’s statement ran directly counter to Blair’s stated objective of preventing the framing of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing international conflict as a war between religions. The mention of the crusades – of course the Crusades were historical wars waged by Christians against Muslims – was problematic on several levels.

The medieval crusades were exploitive wars whose objective was to gain control of the holy lands in the East, and as such involved an invasion of foreign territory. Naturally enough, the term may be distressing to people in Muslim countries based on the historical episodes it refers to. Moreover, in its common usage, the term crusade implies a righteous war – literally a war in the name of the Cross, or in the name of God. As Mason implies, it is this latter application, in its generalized sense, that President Bush was invoking; his likely meaning was that the war on terrorism is a just or righteous

war. However, in using such a historically loaded term, the “righteous” or “just” conflict against terrorism is easily identifiable as a war against Islam itself, just as the original crusades were.

Whether or not Bush was fully aware of how “full of historical resonance in Europe and the Middle East” (Mason 2001) his statement was potentially very damaging to how the Muslim populations in the West were regarded during this period. A world leader had effectively cast them as the parties on the “wrong” side of a holy or righteous conflict. The effects of this vilification were ultimately felt in Europe as well as in the United States, lending credence to the unfortunate possibility that this was, indeed, a war between civilizations. In Europe, the after-effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks with regard to their impact on Muslim populations have been almost as dramatic as in America, and arguably even more far-reaching.

A 2006 British study of 222 British Muslims (Sheridan, 2006: 317), for example, showed a sharp increase in both indirect/implicit discrimination and overt incidents of harassment or discrimination, the latter having risen by 76.3% since 9/11, and the former by 82.6%, as reported by the affected individuals themselves (ibid). These findings demonstrate, according to Lorraine Sheridan, that both active discrimination and more-passive or less-perceptible stereotyping have both increased dramatically in the years following 9/11.

Stereotyping can have a pernicious effect on individuals that is as disruptive to the formation of identity and a sense of belonging as direct discrimination can be, precisely because it is subtle and pervasive. The analysis of these findings includes the observation that religion is a more significant factor in discrimination post-9/11 than race or ethnicity.

This observation supports the notion that Muslim minorities were “invisible”, or that they hid behind the “Caucasian label”, prior to the 9/11 attacks. One wonders, however, how this translates into practice, as religion is not always a quality as race and ethnicity might be, and incidents of discrimination against Muslim or Arab populations are not limited to those visibly engaged (because of style of clothing, for example) in a specific set of religious practices. If it is the case that religion (essentially, “Islamophobia”) rather than race or ethnicity motivates xenophobic attacks, that distinction is nevertheless of little value to those who find themselves under attack.

In the United States, the drive towards increased homeland security has resulted in the suspension of civil liberties for some Muslim and non-Muslim individuals and groups. In Europe, the legislative aftermath of the attacks has possibly been even more far-reaching. Liz Fekete (2004: 3) calls it an “attack on civil rights” directed at Muslim Europeans.

Governments have taken measures to step away from a multicultural model or objective for their populations. Instead, assimilation and “monoculture” are promoted (Fekete, 2004: 3). This is evident in several integration measures that countries have undertaken; one example is the banning of the headscarf in France (Fekete, 2004: 3).

Measures such as these are naturally controversial; in a sense, regardless of the government’s motivations in promoting measures like these, they are problematic by their very nature because they make religious expression an item for public discussion and debate, forcing Muslim populations to defend these aspects of culture and faith, whereas less-visible (in other words, Christian) expressions go unnoticed and are seldom open to debate.

If discrimination against Muslims in Europe/US is indeed more a matter of religion than one of race or ethnicity, it only serves to make the discrimination that is suffered more likely to become entrenched in society through legislation. It may be impossible, in this day and age, to legally discriminate on the basis of race, but religious practices are considerably more vulnerable, and may be just as integral to citizens sense of identity.

The more subtle effect of these changes since 9/11 is that they constitute a threat to many of the strides that have been taken with regard to the development of a hybrid culture where multiculturalism becomes the norm. During the 1990s, particularly in major cosmopolitan cities such as London, Paris, NY themelding of cultures was producing a society in which the creation of an “Other” was, though not eliminated, at least minimized.

Professor of English Literature *

@ayghamd