Faisal Alshammeri

When a country commits the cream of its youth and the very best it has offer to war it is the most serious policy decision that can be undertaken by the leaders of that nation. The German War theoretician Carl von Clausewitz famously stated “War is regarded as nothing but the continuation of state policy with other means.” And so this is the case for The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and it’s coalition partners in Yemen. To date there have been clear accomplishments on the ground by The Armed Forces and in the process addressing strategic security concerns that will directly benefit the safety of the citizens in The Kingdom for the long term. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia made the decision to intervene in Yemen based on a combination of factors, but not limited to, a direct attempt by a foreign government to place a hostile entity directly on the border of The Kingdom, to prevent the importing of and subsequently eliminate lethal weaponry that can target cities inside The Kingdom, to eliminate the threat of terrorism directed against The Kingdom and region at large originating from inside Yemen, and to address a strategic security concern that could potentially disrupt one of the most significant international shipping lanes which reside in The Red Sea. In regard to these issues The Kingdom, the coalition partners of The Gulf Council, and also The United States have been able to show strategic results on all of these issues on the basis of its direct intervention in Yemen.

This is the second attempt by Iran to directly intervene in the affairs of a sovereign country which shares a direct border with The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The first was 2011 in Bahrain, where an internationally recognized and legitimate government was facing an internal security threat directly sponsored by Iran which threatened to spread more instability throughout the region. Had this been successful and not responded to the result would have been planted a strategic security threat literally on the opposite end of a causeway that would provide direct access to The Kingdom. Subsequently The Peninsula Shield Force, consisting of 800 soldiers from The United Arab Emirates and 1,200 from The Kingdom, representing The Gulf Cooperation Council were used to eliminate this direct security threat aimed at security in The Gulf by Tehran. Publicly Iran has called Bahrain it’s fourteenth province which is a rather curious position for a country to take over another. It is not commonplace rhetoric in today’s world to say the least. At bare minimum it does not even recognize sovereignty. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not use fifth columns and terrorist proxies to spread its influence throughout the regain. Iran does, and it has used this nefarious model in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. It’s next chapter of penetrating, infiltrating and destabilizing another country would now focus its efforts on Yemen. For Riyadh and the partners of The Gulf Cooperation Council this was a pattern of behavior that was beyond intolerable and therefore a decisive answer would now have to be articulated to Tehran.

The justification for removing this threat emanating from Tehran to be directed at The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and it’s citizens was provided by the rocket and missile fire coming from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen into the country itself. Najran suffered large-scale missile and rocket fire which caused casualties among the civilian populace. The southern border village of Al-Tuwal was targeted with at least 11 missiles also fired from Houthi-controlled areas inside Yemen. Scud missiles, again originating from Houthi-controlled areas inside Yemen, were fired toward the city of Khamis Mushayt but were destroyed in route. Longer range missiles were launched and targeted cities as far north as Taif. Mecca itself was targeted by scud missiles fired by Houthi’s from Saada, which is their base for all operations. Iran sent these scud missiles to their Houthi proxies of which proof can be abundantly verified by the seizing of the ships at sea containing them in their cargoes while in transit attempting to get to Yemeni ports. Their only purpose is, and they have only been used for, to target cities and the civilian populace inside The Kingdom. Attempts to implement ceasefire agreements cannot be abided by with The Houthi’s. In one instance a ceasefire agreement was violated some 180 times in less than 24 hours. Would The United States tolerate a hostile Mexico which had terrorists inside of it sponsored and armed by (let’s say in this example by a South American country) firing short, medium and long range missiles into San Diego, Phoenix, Albuquerque, El Paso and Austin along it’s southwest border? Would it be casually indifferent to, in this example, for Mexico City to allow the importing lethal weaponry to terrorists, continue to make the efforts to maintain the networks that would logistically arm them, and simply watch this process go on unabated? No it would not and neither would anyone else who takes the lives and well being of its citizens seriously. Had this not been addressed and eliminated the strategic threat to The Kingdom would not only had been considerable in it’s very beginnings, but would only continue to grow possibly ultimately resulting in a strategic threat of global significance.

There are eight critical chokepoints for the transit of oil in the global marketplace of which one is at The Bab al-Mandeb in Yemen. This area is fourth daily in transit volume totaling some 3.8 million barrels per day. At it’s narrowest point if is only 18 miles wide connecting The Red Sea to The Gulf of Aden and beyond to The Indian Ocean. Should this be closed off the only alternative route would force tankers to have to travel around the southern tip of Africa. Rerouting oil around The Cape of Good Hope would increase cost of this commerce vital for the global marketplace but would also add some 2,700 miles of transit from The Kingdom to The United States in just one transit example of many. The vast majority of shipping traffic moving south from The Suez must pass through Bab al-Mandeb so any closure would have a severe repercussions for the region and the global economy. Suez alone represents roughly 8% of global sea-borne trade and Bab al-Mandeb is the door that one opens to begin the journey to Asia. On March 31, 2015 The Houthi’s took control of a key Yemeni military base very close to this very choke point. In October 2016 a UAE civilian ship carrying civilian supplies to deliver medical along with relief aid, and then evacuate wounded and injured civilians was attacked by The Houthi’s with weapons provided by Iran. Also in October 2016 The Houthi’s fired two missiles targeting a U.S. Navy Destroyer operating off the coast of Yemen. A Pentagon spokesman would later state that the missiles were launched from Houthi-controlled territory inside Yemen. This area has since been retaken but lethal surface-to-ship armaments provided by Iran to The Houthi’s could still threaten coalition naval units. Today we can say that Aden, Zinjibar, Lahij, Al Houta, Mukalla have all been recaptured and coalition forces are at the very gates of Sana’a. A strategic foothold has established inside Saada Province, the very home of The Houthi’s and their base for mounting insurrection inside Yemen, firing missiles inside The Kingdom targeting it’s citizenry, and eliminating their threat to international shipping lanes at Bab al-Mandeb.

Today we can say that Aden, Zinjibar, Lahij, Al Houta, Mukalla have all been recaptured and the coalition are at the very gates of Sana’a. The Coalition has established a foothold inside Saada Province, the very home of The Houthi’s and their base for mounting insurrection inside Yemen.