Subscripe to be the first to know about our updates!
Although the “Malalay ” system seeks to export a different picture from the data imposed by internal protests by promoting it as reflecting an external scheme to undermine the system, especially after the rapid intervention by US President Donald Trump and the United States attempt to transfer the file of protests to the UN Security Council, To say that there are internal motives caused the escalation of these allegations and the transition from the level of talk and oral speeches; to the level of escalatory steps taken by the regime against those protests from the beginning of Mashhad to many other provinces and Iranian cities.
It is worth noting that such protests were not the first in Tehran’s history. Mashhad had witnessed similar protests 25 years ago. In 1992, seven protesters were executed on the basis of their responsibility for the Mashhad protests by a decision by Mohammad Yazdi, And the city of Qazvin witnessed similar protests during the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani. In 1994, the cities of Shiraz, Mashhad and Irak witnessed similar protests that were suppressed. In 2001, Iran witnessed protests by teachers against the Khatami government. In 2015, protests were held against miners against the backdrop of the closure of a number of mines and the loss of their rights until the scene was renewed again in 2017 by an economic paper. A number of possible scenarios were invoked as a reflection of the signs of these protests and the consequences of their continuation. On the internal “Malalay” system in Tehran.
Facing Steps
The internal regime in Tehran followed a number of steps to confront such protests. It took either peaceful steps by publishing the language of dialogue and making promises to “reconsider” the budget presented by President Rouhani and work to improve economic conditions inside.
And the other steps were the escalation of the counter: started from the escalation of arrests and violence against demonstrators to the threat of the use of armed militias, and perhaps the most important mechanisms of confrontation taken by the Iranian regime, as:
Possible scenarios
Although these protests are an important indicator of the transformations witnessed by Iranian society, and what may reflect the future in the form and structure of the existing regime and different parties, but there are still a number of possible scenarios when escalated, including:
Therefore, Rouhani is likely to contain these protests and free them from their content by carrying out economic reforms at the micro and regional levels, with the launching of new development plans to reach structural reforms.
Moreover, despite the state of confusion and lack of clarity dominating the Iranian scene; and the movement of conservative fundamentalist tendencies in these demonstrations in order to garner legislative gains in the upcoming elections, but they will retreat, with an internal letter not to expand these protests for lack of abuse by hostile countries seeking To sabotage Iran, in a clear reference to the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s participation in such protests.
On the other hand, there are some negative perceptions of the possibility of the evolution of disputes political and military wings, which may prompt the Council of Experts to lead the activation of “Article n. 111” of the Iranian Constitution, which states that the Supreme Leader is said when he is unable to perform its constitutional duties.
Overall, although it is too early to predict the course of the recent protest movement in Iran and to what extent it could pose a real threat to the ruling regime and what could result from a map of internal transformations in Tehran. However, these protests have revealed the extent of the Iranians’ anger at the regime, the pro-reform militias led by Rohani and the conservative led by Khamenei. These protests may prompt the regime to unite for a while, but it is certain that the rival factions within it will then quarrel, especially since both Rowhani and Khamenei have different interests and different support bases. Therefore, they can’t co-exist peacefully, while at the same time paying attention to the interests of their respective constituencies. Therefore, the general evidence indicates that the legitimacy of the regime is eroding, but the reality confirms that its ability to continue is not yet exhausted.
Political studies unit *
Resources
[1] ) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/09/iran-protests-deaths-custody-human-rights
[2] ) https://futureuae.com/ar-AE/Mainpage/Item/3592
Subscripe to be the first to know about our updates!
Follow our latest news and services through our Twitter account