



The repercussions of the Iranian protests on the internal regime in Tehran



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Although the “Malalay ” system seeks to export a different picture from the data imposed by internal protests by promoting it as reflecting an external scheme to undermine the system, especially after the rapid intervention by US President Donald Trump and the United States attempt to transfer the file of protests to the UN Security Council, To say that there are internal motives caused the escalation of these allegations and the transition from the level of talk and oral speeches; to the level of escalatory steps taken by the regime against those protests from the beginning of Mashhad to many other provinces and Iranian cities.

It is worth noting that such protests were not the first in Tehran's history. Mashhad had witnessed similar protests 25 years ago. In 1992, seven protesters were executed on the basis of their responsibility for the Mashhad protests by a decision by Mohammad Yazdi, And the city of Qazvin witnessed similar protests during the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani. In 1994, the cities of Shiraz, Mashhad and Irak witnessed similar protests that were suppressed. In 2001, Iran witnessed protests by teachers against the Khatami government. In 2015, protests were held against miners against the backdrop of the closure of a number of mines and the loss of their rights until the scene was renewed again in 2017 by an economic paper. A number of possible scenarios were invoked as a reflection of the signs of these protests and the consequences of their continuation. On the internal “Malalay” system in Tehran.

Facing Steps

The internal regime in Tehran followed a number of steps to confront such protests. It took either peaceful steps by publishing the language of dialogue and making promises to "reconsider" the budget presented by President Rouhani and work to improve economic conditions inside.

And the other steps were the escalation of the counter: started from the escalation of arrests and violence against demonstrators to the threat of the use of armed militias, and perhaps the most important mechanisms of confrontation taken by the Iranian regime, as:

1- Charges of employment: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei accused the demonstrators of being "agents and saboteurs." This repressive statement serves as a green light to the judiciary and security agencies to take immediate measures to end what he called the "conspiracy".



- 2- The threat of the demonstrators: Iran's Interior Minister, the head of the judiciary and the Iranian prosecutor general, as well as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, threatened anti-regime demonstrators with an iron fist if all the protests continued.(1)
- 3- Violent confrontation: Based on the mechanism of "threat to the demonstrators" from the head of the regime, the head of the judiciary, the prosecutor of the country, the security forces had many grounds for the use of excessive repression to eliminate every demonstration in the cities of the Republic; where the security forces used tear gas And water hoses and batons to disperse the demonstrators, and on the wide range of protests in different cities and governorates of the Islamic Republic.(2)
- 4- Tarnish the image of the protesters: The regime in Tehran accused the demonstrators of being vandals and not peaceful, in order to tarnish the image of the protesters in the information war conducted by the Iranian regime to justify the use of violence and excessive force in the face.
- 5- Surrounding the protesters: Security forces tried to surround the protests to eliminate, especially student protests, for example: Iranian internal security forces and the Revolutionary Guard and the mass mobilization of the "Basij" students, Tehran University students who shouted slogans on campus, such as "Death Of the dictator".
- 6- Summoning the militias: This is a future scenario and is unlikely to occur unless the situation worsens, which may damage the structure and arms of the regime. On May 2, 2018, the former Iraqi Minister of Transport, "Baquer Solagh", stated that "the demonstrations in Iran came with the support of global arrogance. These demonstrations will fail with the strength of the iron. The popular mobilization

forces will have a big role in suppressing these demonstrations that want to overthrow the mandate of the jurist, our spirit has redemption. "

7- Blocking "social networking": Iranian authorities blocked the entire social networking site, especially after some of the pages circulated on the Internet venues and news events, in addition to broadcast clips of demonstrators such as "Amed News" run by exiled Iranian journalist "Ruhollah Zam" He said. Iran has also reduced the speed of the Internet, which was followed in the 2009 protests as well.

8- Steps to calm: This was reflected in the speech of Iranian President Rohani, in which he demanded the Iranians to express their views without resorting to violence, recognizing the economic difficulties that led citizens to take to the streets, with promises to end such obstacles.



Possible scenarios

Although these protests are an important indicator of the transformations witnessed by Iranian society, and what may reflect the future in the form and structure of the existing regime and different parties, but there are still a number of possible scenarios when escalated, including:

1 -The first scenario (potential containment): Contrary to the 2009 protests, there is no leadership today capable of mobilizing people to engage in an all-out mass uprising. Also, there is no leadership opposed to the government from a social project that wins the poor.

Therefore, Rouhani is likely to contain these protests and free them from their content by carrying out economic reforms at the micro and regional levels, with the launching of new development plans to reach structural reforms.

Moreover, despite the state of confusion and lack of clarity dominating the Iranian scene; and the movement of conservative fundamentalist tendencies in these demonstrations in order to garner legislative gains in the upcoming elections, but they will retreat, with an internal letter not to expand these protests for lack of abuse by hostile countries seeking To sabotage Iran, in a clear reference to the UAE and Saudi Arabia's participation in such protests.

2 -The second scenario (scaling the Revolutionary Guards and foreign armaments): This is a test of a spiritual force and its ability to respond to claims. However, that scenario is less likely to be implemented because the Revolutionary Guard “penetrated”(3)the Iranian state through military, economic, political and external influence. Civil war or military and political wings(4).

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On the other hand, there are some negative perceptions of the possibility of the evolution of disputes political and military wings, which may prompt the Council of Experts to lead the activation of “Article n. 111” of the Iranian Constitution, which states that the Supreme Leader is said when he is unable to perform its constitutional duties.

Overall, although it is too early to predict the course of the recent protest movement in Iran and to what extent it could pose a real threat to the ruling regime and what could result from a map of internal transformations in Tehran. However, these protests have revealed the extent of the Iranians' anger at the regime, the pro-reform militias led by Rohani and the conservative led by Khamenei. These protests may prompt the regime to unite for a while, but it is certain that the rival factions within it will then quarrel, especially since both Rowhani and Khamenei have different interests and different support bases. Therefore, they can't co-exist peacefully, while at the same time paying attention to the interests of their respective constituencies. Therefore, the general evidence indicates that the legitimacy of the regime is eroding, but the reality confirms that its ability to continue is not yet exhausted.

Resources


1-<https://goo.gl/BwFPWm>

2-<https://futureuae.com/ar-AE/Mainpage/Item/3592>

3-<https://www.noonpost.org/content/21521>

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