



# **The Indications of the American escalation against Iran and its implications for the regional balances**



There is a renewed conflict between the United States and Iran since the arrival of American President “Donald Trump” to the White House, as he always waved by the "paper" of (The Nuclear Agreement) – which was the most important of the Obama administration's foreign policy - with the aim of undermining Iranian expansion in the Arab region. In light of the split in the institutional reactions of Washington.

As well as, the Iranian escalation with a sharply statements to the threat of exit from the Convention, Which leading to many of the questions, First regarding the inside of the United States and the balance of power between institutions inside, also the implications of the escalation and its motives; as well as its mechanisms and their reflection on the management of the files of the region with the Actors of the Middle East and the European exterior.

## The Legalization of conflict

The United States has painted the legal stamp on the agenda of the political conflict with the Republic of Iran, and that's accordance with the decision of Security Council N. 2231, which ratified the nuclear agreement between Iran and the six major powers (5 + 1) in July 2015.

The decision provides for the continued denial of Iran's possession ballistic missile technology for eight years and that imports of conventional weapons will be banned for a period of five years and that they will be allowed to be acquired during this period only by a decision of the Security Council.

In view of Iran's lack of commitment to the "spirit of the international Decision "



and the continued development of its ballistic missiles, the US House of Representatives voted unanimously to impose new sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile program to “stifle” on Tehran without undermining or canceling the nuclear agreement. And that’s by 423 votes to two in favor of the adoption of the "Iran's ballistic missile law and the enforcement of international sanctions".

In addition, it has sanctioned some 18 Iranian individuals and institutions involved in supporting the ballistic missile program or working in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Thus, all the escalation is related only to “Ballistic missile program”, not to Tehran's violation of the nuclear agreement and the return to the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

It is worth noting that the "trampic" escalation against Iran and its nuclear program has received many divisions within the Trump administration.



There is a view that the president should abide by his electoral pledges to undermine this agreement, which he sees as "the worst" in America's history. and in the other view , they preferring to respect the Law and institutions, which was under the auspices of the agreement and its consent during the era of Barack Obama, as well as avoid a clash with the European countries, especially who's sign it after it announced its intention to reconsider the terms of the agreement again.

The split between Trump and state's institutions is not the result of the situation. As from the first day of his inauguration, the features of the clash have become clear in his ideas and policies that may be very contrary to the orientations of the American State Institution according to its political and security assessments, among which:

- The first clash: with the judiciary in two consecutive crises, the first on February 3, 2017, and the second on the ninth of the same month, when the judiciary rejected the decision issued by the President on January 27, 2017 on the prohibition of the entry of citizens of a number of States to America on the pretext of protecting its security from terrorism, The Supreme Court recently imposed a partial ban on the citizens of these countries, the features of the clash between the President and the judiciary is not over.
- The second clash: represented in the near-agreement between Republicans and Democrats that some Trump's practices may be a threat to national security, which reflected the reaction of the two parties to discuss the president some security issues, the test of the ballistic missile launched by North Korea on February 13, 2017, during he had dinner with Japanese Prime Minister Shizu Abe at the resort



of Mao Algo.

- The third clash: Represented in the differences in perceptions of some regional and international files, such as President Trump's relationship with Russia, and his sharp criticism against some European countries and NATO, as well as the situation of Iraq and the Ukrainian crisis, and so on many other issues.

## The indications of escalation

The temporal indications of the American escalation against Tehran reflect a number of political objectives, including:

1- The American desire to regain its role in the events of the region, although lacking in the absence of an agreed political agenda in light of the clear division between the officials of Trump administration on the way to deal with the files of the region.



Tehran, on the other hand, has a clear agenda known as Iran's 2025 strategy. It is considered the "most important national document after the Iranian Constitution," which states the international privacy of Tehran and its attempt to transform from an emerging force to an international force that is reflected in the territory of 2025. It exploited Obama's retreat to strengthen its map in both Iraq and Syria and benefited from avoiding direct confrontation with the states The United States, and the West in general, by adopting what has become known as the proxy war approach in the region, by establishing and arming militias (as popular militia militias) that are shared by the political agenda.

2 -The nature of the political stage that witnessed by the Middle East after the Arab spring revolutions, the structural imbalance that has afflicted the national constants and the growing influence of the terrorist organizations in many fragile countries in the region, as well as his siege for the Iraq, suggesting that the nature of the next conflict will be "Iran and its allies"

3 - Declaration of the resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister "Saad Hariri" from the Saudi Riyadh, and via Al-Arabiya, where the geography and media container, which broadcast; sends a very strong messages, which the most important that :“Iran is the first party to matter, before Lebanon”.

4 -The reactions of Saudi Arabia on various regional and international levels as a result of the launch of “the Al-Houthis ballistic missile” on Riyadh and the American condemnation of this; which confirming that there are a number of goals beyond the mere "reaction" of the launch of a "ballistic missile" did not reach the target; in the air.



5-The escalation against Iran is a meeting point of the second personal interests “Trump – Netanyahu” . Especially in light of what they both suffer from intractable internal situations in their countries; it calls for the export of crises abroad, and distract the attention of the interior. As, the file of the election campaign of Tramp in Russia has reached a very sensitive stage, and the corruption files of the Israeli prime minister have threatened his political future and his survival in the government.

## The Balancing of transformations in the region

There are a number of transformations that impose themselves on the Arab map, necessitating the American intervention to support their allies in the Middle East.



Although, the United States possesses a missile system capable of destroying ballistic missiles in its first stage, Which confirmed by the US military last May. However, the changes that may occur in the region, which may appear under the development of Iran's ballistic programs to the extent that may pose a threat to the security of "Trump" allies in the region in support of entities subject to "classification of terrorism" according to the US agenda, among which:

**- First: The Houthis**

Given the Houthis' possession of a large arsenal of ballistic missiles and launching them towards the Kingdom, In spite of the fact that they have been dealt with in all cases, the main concern is that if they possess advanced missiles, they may be able to inflict large losses in the Kingdom in the coming period, if Iran decides to provide the Houthis with sophisticated weapons. Thus, Iran poses a direct threat to Saudi Arabia from the south by supporting the Houthis. Tehran can also use various means of pressure to involve the Houthis in the political process, so that it has a strong arm in Yemen and southern Kingdom, and represents a permanent threat to them.

**- Second: Hezbollah**

There is a strong relationship between Hezbollah and Iran, which may make it provide the party with advanced weapons, especially missiles and the advanced ones, including medium-range missiles, which can reach targets in the occupied territories. This is what happened during the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, Therefore, the arrival of any sophisticated and far-reaching missiles and high precision of the hands of Hezbollah, this completely threatens Israel,



especially that the "iron dome" was not as what was expected.

## The International Options

The continued escalation between the United States and Iran has set a strong pressure on the international community, especially the European countries, which have found themselves faced with difficult choices. On the one hand, European countries seek to enhance the chances of continuing the nuclear agreement reached by Iran and the "5 + 1" group (including three European countries, France, Britain and Germany) on 14 July 2015, while on the other hand, Which is carried out by Iran in the regional arena, in addition to the ballistic missile system, and therefore has become before two options are represented in:



- The first option: is exert new pressure on Iran, the most important of which is not to seek to impede any American tendency to impose new sanctions on Iran, in a way that will increase the level of pressure on Iran in this regard. As well as the possibility of identification with the US position in the future in the event of whether the cessation of the agreement and returned the nuclear file to the Security Council again, where it is expected that the imposition of international sanctions on Iran again, perhaps more powerful, especially that Iran in this case will go To develop its nuclear program to restore its former nuclear capabilities.
- The second opinion: is to reduce the volume of economic and financial dealings with Iran if it continues to adopt the same radical policy at the nuclear and regional levels. In other words, non-intervention by western companies and banks in order to conclude more economic deals with entities within Iran, This option represents the "most appropriate trend" especially considering that these companies have basically a number of motives that make them reluctant to enter the Iranian market from Fearing involvement in financial dealings with Revolutionary Guards or anyone accused of supporting terrorism and the ballistic missile program in a manner that could expose it to sanctions by the United States, such as the sanctions imposed on France's BNP Paribas in June 2014 .

## Based on the above


It can be said that the bet of the American's "escalation" is always "renewed" as the American strategy of encircling Iran's expansion is designed to protect its interests and balance the interests of its allies in the region, in light of the confusion of the



European and international position, making it "close to the corner" towards the Iranian position on the nuclear agreement, and another close to the US position on the Iranian regional role and the development of the ballistic missile program, which led to the escalation towards the backdrop of Tehran's acquisition of two military programs seeking to develop them permanently, the first of ballistic missiles, and the second related to Fast marine s, based on Security Council Resolution "2231" on July 14, 2015, which forbidden the implementation of Iran's ballistic missile tests for 8 years.



# What We Do



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